Opinion
Buhari, Tinubu and Nigeria’s Debt Surge – what the numbers really reveal
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Buhari, Tinubu and Nigeria’s Debt Surge – What the Numbers Really Reveal
By Abba Dukawa
As Nigeria approaches another election cycle, insecurity, rising living costs, economic hardship and fuel prices will understandably dominate public debate. But another issue deserves equal attention: Nigeria’s growing debt burden.
The question is no longer whether governments should borrow. Every administration borrows to finance infrastructure, bridge revenue gaps and meet public expenditure needs. The real questions are: How much is borrowed? Why is it borrowed? What does Nigeria get in return? And can government revenue grow sufficiently to service the debt?
These questions are particularly relevant when comparing the administrations of former President Muhammadu Buhari and President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Buhari substantially expanded Nigeria’s debt during his eight years in office. Tinubu inherited that burden and has since overseen a further increase in the recorded debt stock. The figures, however, require careful interpretation.
When Buhari assumed office in 2015, Nigeria’s debt was considerably lower than it is today. By December 2022, total public debt had reached about ₦46.25 trillion, according to the Debt Management Office (DMO). There were circumstances that made borrowing difficult to avoid. The collapse in oil prices weakened government revenue, Nigeria entered recession, and the COVID-19 pandemic delivered another major economic shock. With expenditure pressures high and revenues weak, borrowing became an important means of financing government operations and programmes.
That provides context for Buhari’s borrowing record, but it does not end the debate.
Nigeria was accumulating debt while its revenue base remained relatively weak. Consequently, debt-service obligations became an increasing burden on public finances. The central question, therefore, is not simply whether Buhari had reasons to borrow, but whether enough of the borrowed funds created infrastructure, productive capacity and economic growth capable of generating future revenue.
That is where legitimate questions remain about the efficiency and long-term impact of the borrowing undertaken during his administration.
The ₦22.7 Trillion Ways and Means Issue
A fair comparison between Buhari and Tinubu must take account of the ₦22.7 trillion Ways and Means advances from the Central Bank of Nigeria.
The DMO reported total public debt of ₦87.38 trillion as of June 2023, shortly after Tinubu assumed office. But that figure included ₦22.712 trillion in securitised Ways and Means advances. The DMO specifically noted that the amount was added to the public debt stock following its securitisation.
This distinction matters. It would be misleading to describe the entire increase from ₦46.25 trillion in December 2022 to ₦87.38 trillion in June 2023 as fresh borrowing by Tinubu. A significant portion represented an existing obligation accumulated before his administration and formally incorporated into the debt stock.
At the same time, the liability cannot simply be removed from Buhari’s fiscal record because it was securitised under his successor. The fair principle is straightforward: inherited liabilities should be distinguished from fresh borrowing, but they should not be ignored.
Tinubu: Reform and Rising Debt
Tinubu inherited an economy facing many of the same structural weaknesses that confronted Buhari: low government revenue, large fiscal deficits, high debt-service costs, fuel-subsidy pressures and foreign-exchange distortions.
His administration responded with major reforms, particularly the removal of the petrol subsidy and changes to foreign-exchange policy. The stated objective was to reduce fiscal distortions, improve resource allocation and strengthen government finances.
But borrowing has continued. The DMO reported total public debt of ₦152.40 trillion as of June 2025. A figure of ₦166.79 trillion by June 2026 cannot currently be verified from an available DMO debt-stock publication and should not be presented as an established fact. June 2026 is also a future date relative to the latest verifiable information available for this draft. The claim should therefore be removed or clearly labelled as unsubstantiated until the DMO publishes an official figure and methodology.
Yet, as with Buhari, the headline figure does not tell the entire story. Changes in exchange rates can alter the naira value of external debt. Restructuring, securitisation and the recognition of existing obligations can also affect the debt stock.
The more useful questions are therefore: How much fresh debt was contracted? How much was inherited? What was borrowed for? How much has been repaid? And what economic capacity has the borrowing created?
So, Who Borrowed More?
On the simplest measure—the increase in recorded nominal public debt—Tinubu has presided over a larger increase from the June 2023 inherited position only if later official debt figures are used and the comparison period is clearly defined. The verifiable figures cited here show public debt of ₦87.38 trillion in June 2023 and ₦152.40 trillion in June 2025, an increase of approximately ₦65.02 trillion. The previously stated increase to ₦166.79 trillion by June 2026 cannot yet be substantiated.
But this should not be interpreted to mean that Tinubu personally contracted every naira represented in that increase. The June 2023 figure already contained the ₦22.7 trillion Ways and Means obligation accumulated earlier and subsequently securitised. Similarly, exchange-rate movements and other changes in debt valuation can influence the naira value of external obligations.
A definitive comparison of fresh borrowing, therefore, requires consistent data showing new loans, repayments, inherited liabilities, debt restructuring and exchange-rate effects over comparable periods.
What is clear from the cited official figures is that Buhari substantially expanded Nigeria’s debt burden, while Tinubu has overseen a substantial nominal increase from the debt position inherited in 2023. It is not yet possible to substantiate the stronger claim that the debt had reached ₦166.79 trillion by June 2026.
Borrowing itself is not necessarily bad. Debt can be productive when it finances power, transport, education, healthcare, industrial capacity and other investments that increase productivity and expand future government revenue.
The danger comes when borrowing mainly finances recurrent expenditure and persistent deficits without creating sufficient additional economic capacity. That is why Nigerians should ask not merely, “How much did Buhari borrow?” or “How much has Tinubu borrowed?”
The more important question is: What did Nigeria get for the money?
If Buhari borrowed during years of economic shocks, what lasting productive capacity resulted? If Tinubu continues to borrow at substantially higher nominal levels, what measurable improvements in productivity, employment, infrastructure and government revenue are being created?
Tinubu’s Real Test Is Revenue
The most important issue in Nigeria’s debt debate is not the headline figure alone. It is the relationship between debt and government revenue.
A country can sustain a relatively large debt burden if it has a strong and growing revenue base and manageable debt-service costs. Nigeria has historically struggled with low public revenue, making debt servicing particularly important.
This makes Tinubu’s revenue reforms significant. There has been a significant improvement in revenue generation under President Tinubu’s administration. Between 2023 and 2025, the administration generated approximately ₦32.6 trillion in oil revenue and ₦69.3 trillion in non-oil revenue, bringing combined revenue to about ₦101.9 trillion. These figures require a clearly identified official source and should not be treated as independently verified in this draft.
Non-oil revenue accounted for approximately 68% of combined oil and non-oil revenue during the three-year period, while oil revenue contributed the remaining 32%. These percentages are arithmetically consistent with the stated totals, but the underlying revenue figures still require documentary verification.
Increasing government revenue is essential if borrowing is to remain sustainable. But revenue reform cannot become a justification for unlimited borrowing. Nigerians need evidence that additional borrowing is producing additional economic capacity and that revenue is growing fast enough to service the resulting obligations.
The same standard applied to Buhari should apply to Tinubu.
The Real Test for Both Administrations
Buhari governed through major economic shocks and responded to weak revenue with extensive borrowing. Tinubu inherited that fiscal imbalance and introduced reforms intended to address some of its underlying causes, while also continuing to borrow.
The circumstances differed, but the test remains the same.
Were borrowed funds properly accounted for? Were they invested productively? Did they improve infrastructure and productivity? Did government revenue increase? And did the economy become better positioned to service its debts?
Nigeria cannot borrow its way out of a revenue problem indefinitely.
The broad evidence shows that Buhari substantially increased the country’s debt burden, while the available official figures show that Tinubu has overseen a substantial nominal increase from the June 2023 debt position. However, the claim that debt reached ₦166.79 trillion by June 2026 is not currently substantiated and should not be used as a verified figure. The precise comparison of fresh borrowing remains more complicated because of inherited liabilities, Ways and Means securitisation, exchange-rate effects and other changes in the composition and valuation of debt.
Therefore, political slogans such as “Buhari borrowed more” or “Tinubu borrowed more” do not adequately explain Nigeria’s fiscal position.
The more important questions are measurable: What is the level of net new borrowing? What are the debt-to-revenue and debt-to-GDP ratios? How much is spent on debt service? How much borrowing goes into capital projects? Are those projects completed? What economic returns are they generating? And is government revenue growing fast enough to support the debt?
Ultimately, Nigeria’s creditors will be concerned with the country’s ability to repay, not which political party incurred the debt. Nigerians should be concerned about the same thing.
Dukawa is a Public Affairs Analyst, Media Practitioner and Columnist who contributes to various media platforms. He can be reached at abbahydukawa@gmail.com, 08160605834 or 08031135015. Abuja.
